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abstract: Why some social systems form groups composed of kin,
while others do not, has gone largely untreated in the literature.
Using an individual-based simulation model, we explore the de-
mographic consequences of making kinship a criterion in group
formation. We find that systems where social groups consist of one-
generation breeding associations may face a serious trade-off between
degree of altruism and group size that is largely mediated by their
kin composition. On the one hand, restricting groups to close kin
allows the evolution of highly altruistic behaviors but may limit group
size to suboptimal levels, the more severely so the smaller the intrinsic
fecundity of the species and the stricter the kin admission rule. Group
size requirements, on the other hand, can be met by admitting nonkin
into groups, but not without limiting the degree of altruism that can
evolve. As a solution to this conundrum, we show that if helping
roles within groups are assigned through a lottery rather than being
genetically determined, maximum degrees of altruism can evolve in
groups of nonrelatives of any size. Such a “lottery” mechanism may
explain reproductive and helping patterns in organisms as varied as
the cellular slime molds, pleometrotic ants, and Galapagos hawks.
Keywords: sociality, mutualism, cooperation, inclusive fitness, relat-
edness, lottery assignment of helping roles.
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Much of the study of social evolution in the last few dec-
ades has been concerned with the role of relatedness in
the origin and maintenance of sociality. This concern orig-
inated in Hamilton’s (1964) rule, which states that altruism
will spread when : the benefit to recipients, dis-BR 1 C
counted by the relatedness of the actor to the recipients,
exceeds the costs to the actor of an altruistic act. Facilitated
by modern molecular techniques, researchers have mea-
sured intragroup relatedness in a great variety of social
systems (for recent reviews, see Pamilo et al. 1997; Hughes
1998; Ross 2001; Clutton-Brock 2002), often discovering
much lower levels than anticipated, even in highly altru-
istic systems (e.g., Rissing et al. 1989; Hughes et al. 1993;
Kukuk and Sage 1994; Faaborg et al. 1995; Strassmann et
al. 1995; Danforth et al. 1996; Goodisman and Ross 1997;
Queller et al. 2000). These findings, along with the fact
that even clonal organisms are for the most part nonsocial
(Stern and Foster 1997), reinforce the need to place greater
emphasis on the other two parameters of Hamilton’s in-
equality—the costs and benefits of group living and co-
operation. These parameters are largely a function of the
ecological and demographic circumstances under which
sociality evolves.
Because ecological and demographic factors are often
diverse and complex (Rubenstein and Wrangham 1986;
Slobodchikoff 1988; Janson 2000), it has been argued that
a simple unified framework to explain sociality from an
ecological perspective cannot be easily attained (e.g.,
Queller and Strassmann 1998). The problem can be sim-
plified, however, by considering that the shape of the func-
tion relating average individual fitness to group size reflects
the net effect of ecological interactions—cooperation,
competition, predation, and resource acquisition—that af-
fect the fitness of individuals living in groups. The form
of this relationship can thus be used to make general pre-
dictions about the origin, size, and dynamics of social
groups, as done in models of group size evolution (Gir-
aldeau and Caraco 1993; Higashi and Yamamura 1993),
group foraging (Clark and Mangel 1986; Giraldeau and
Caraco 2000), cooperative breeding (Emlen 1984; Cour-
champ et al. 1999b; Kokko et al. 2001), reproductive skew
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Table 1: Vectors of acceptability indices based on kinship (A[Rj] in eq. [3]) for the
four models of group formation
Model




(1/8 ≤ Rj ! 1/2)
Second cousins
(1/32 ≤ Rj ! 1/8)
Nonkin
(Rj ! 1/32)
Nonkin 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Kin preference 1.0 .7 .4 .1
At least cousins 1.0 .7 .4 .0
Sibs only 1.0 .0 .0 .0
Note: Indices weight acceptability of prospective joiner to a group based on its average relatedness
to existing group members. Equilibrium average within-group relatedness resulting from each of these
models shown in figure 1.
(Vehrencamp 1983; Reeve and Emlen 2000), and, more
generally, group living and sociality (Avile´s 1999, 2002;
Krause and Ruxton 2002).
As shown in a previous article (Avile´s 1999), relatively
simple solutions for the expected size and dynamics of
social groups and the conditions leading to group living
and cooperation can be derived as a function of an intrinsic
rate of growth, group carrying capacity, and cooperation
parameters. This formulation uses the standard assump-
tion that group living and cooperation cause certain com-
ponents of fitness to increase as a function of group size
(see models above; for empirical support of this assump-
tion, see Raffa and Berryman 1987; Cash et al. 1993; Itoˆ
1993; Wiklund and Andersson 1994; Avile´s and Tufin˜o
1998; Clutton-Brock et al. 1999; Courchamp et al. 1999a).
Building upon this framework, in a companion article
(Avile´s et al. 2002), we explored the evolution of one-
generation breeding associations among nonrelatives. Us-
ing an individual-based simulation model, we showed that
among nonrelatives cooperative group living readily
evolves when the relative fitness costs of cooperation
within groups are small to moderate; larger group carrying
capacities lead to the evolution of larger groups but lower
cooperative tendencies; and the intrinsic rate of growth
has no effect on equilibrium levels of cooperation, group-
ing tendencies, or the average group size but influences
the dynamics—stable, periodic, or chaotic—of the groups
and the global population.
Here, we examine the interaction between demography
and kinship in social evolution by extending this model
to a range of kinship structures. Our focus, however, is
not on the effects of relatedness on social evolution per
se, as this topic has already been the subject of extensive
study (Hamilton 1964; Queller 1992; Frank 1998). Instead,
we focus on the demographic consequences of making
kinship a criterion in group formation. We argue that such
demographic consequences, and their dependence on pa-
rameters such as the intrinsic fecundity of a species, cannot
be ignored when trying to explain the kin composition of
social groups.
The Model
As in Avile´s et al. (2002), in this simulation model indi-
viduals come together in one-generation breeding asso-
ciations as a function of their genetically coded “grouping”
tendencies. Once within groups, individuals help one an-
other as a function of their separately coded “cooperative”
tendencies. Cooperation increases group productivity but,
when interactions are altruistic, lowers the relative fitness
of cooperators within groups. Following a social phase,
offspring produced within the groups join a global pool
from which they disperse to restart a new cycle of group
formation. As generations of group formation proceed,
grouping, cooperation, and the average group size evolve.
We depart from Avile´s et al. (2002), where only nonkin
associations were considered, by systematically exploring
a variety of rules that use kinship as a criterion in group
admission (table 1). Other relatively minor departures
from the Avile´s et al. (2002) model are discussed in the
appendix in the online edition of the American Naturalist.
Per Capita Group Productivity and Relative
Fitness within Groups
We assume that the number of offspring produced per
capita is maximized in groups of intermediate size, re-
flecting a balance between positive effects of cooperation
and negative effects of crowding and competition within
groups. Following Avile´s (1999), this is modeled with the
following function:
¯r cn gf(n)p e e n , (1)
where n is the size of a group, r is an intrinsic rate of
growth parameter, c is the inverse of a group carrying
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capacity parameter, and , taken to range between 0 andg¯
1, represents the average cooperative tendencies of mem-
bers of a group. Given these definitions, er represents the
reproductive output of members of a group in the absence
of cooperative or competitive interactions, reflects thecne
negative effects of crowding and competition given limited
resources available to a group, and represents the syn-g¯n
ergistic effects of cooperation. The product of these three
factors is a one-humped function when (Avile´sg¯ 1 0
1999). In the simulations, r and c are fixed parameters of
a run while evolves.g¯
We allow for the possibility that cooperators suffer a
relative fitness cost within their groups by multiplying
equation (1) by the following relative fitness function,
relfitness p a bg , (2)i i
to calculate an individual’s contribution to its group’s off-
spring pool. In equation (2), gi represents the cooperative
tendencies of individual i; b, the slope of the function,
determines the extent to which cooperation carries a rel-
ative fitness cost; and a, the intercept of the function, is
calculated so that the average cooperator within a group
will have a relative fitness of 1.0 (i.e., , where¯ap 1 bg
is the average cooperative tendencies of members of ag¯
group). The parameter b controls the extent to which
interactions are mutualistic versus altruistic. When mu-
tualistic ( ), cooperation carries no relative fitnessbp 0
costs and all group members benefit equally from com-
munal activities. When altruistic ( ), individuals whob 1 0
help more have a lower proportional share of the group’s
offspring pool (for similar definitions of altruism, see
Uyenoyama and Feldman 1980; Wilson 1990). In either
case, groups with greater cooperative tendencies are more
productive.
Genetic and Breeding Systems
Individuals are diploid, with grouping and cooperative
tendencies each represented by 15 binary loci (0 or 1 as
possible alleles) that translate additively to phenotypic val-
ues between 0.0 and 1.0 (proportion of 1’s in the diploid
complement). Haploid gametes are produced through pro-
cesses mimicking meiosis and recombination. Mutation,
at a rate of 102 per locus per generation, is implemented
through an inversion/translocation mechanism to avoid
the bias against the most common allele introduced from
simply mutating randomly chosen sites to the opposite
allele.
For simplicity, we model a single sex, with individuals
primarily performing the female function but also being
capable of contributing sperm. Because individuals choose
mates at random from a large global population prior to
group formation, selfing is avoided and the system is
equivalent to a two-sex system in which males are only
available to fertilize the eggs. The model is thus appropriate
for organisms with outbred breeding systems (either where
mating takes place prior to group formation or where
males move between groups), but not for organisms char-
acterized by inbred social groups such as the naked mole
rats (Faulkes et al. 1997; Burland et al. 2002) or social
spiders (Avile´s 1997). To facilitate relatedness calculations,
all offspring in a clutch are sired by the same father.
Group Formation
Groups form by accretion, with the probability that a new
member joins a group being
¯join p g # g# h(n)# A(R ), (3)j j j
where gj represents the grouping tendency of the pro-
spective joiner j, is the average grouping tendencies ofg¯
existing group members, and and A(Rj) weight ad-h(n)
missibility into a group as a function of the number of
existing group members and their average relatedness to
the prospective joiner, respectively (see below; table 1).
We assume that groups are increasingly less likely to
accept new members as they reach or exceed their opti-
mum size, nopt, and completely reject new joiners after
reaching their stable size, n∗ (for a definition and calcu-
lation of these two quantities from eq. [1], see appendix).
Accordingly, we set when ,h(n)p 1 n ! n h(n)popt
when , and∗ ∗ ∗(n  n)/(n  n ) n ≤ n ! n h(n)p 0opt opt
when . Consistent with the empirical observation∗n ≥ n
that groups in nature typically exceed their optimum size
(see Giraldeau 1988), these functions imply that in the
region of conflict over admission decisions between pro-
spective joiners and the group—from the optimum to the
stable group size (Giraldeau and Caraco 1993; Higashi and
Yamamura 1993)—groups can only partially prevent ad-
mission of new members. Because nopt and n
∗ are a func-
tion of an evolving cooperation parameter (appendix),
they also evolve in the simulations.
We explore four models of group formation leading to
different degrees of relatedness within groups (table 1).
These models—nonkin, kin preference, at least cousins,
and sibs only—assume different acceptance probabilities
for individuals of different degrees of relatedness to ex-
isting group members (A[Rj] in eq. [3]). We assess relat-
edness by keeping track of pedigree relationships up to
the great grandmother generation, a task facilitated by the
fact that all offspring in a clutch share the same father.
During the group formation phase, individuals leave the
global pool one at a time in search of a group to join. In
the sibs only, at least cousins, and kin preference models,
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individuals leave the global pool in order and visit most
recently founded groups first. Because newly dispersed rel-
atives occupy recently formed groups, this creates a linearly
viscous population structure that maximizes encounters
between relatives and, in the sibs only and at least cousins
models, has the effect of producing groups that fission
along family lines despite having been formed by accretion.
We eliminate population viscosity in the nonkin model by
having individuals depart the global pool in random order.
In all models, potential immigrants continue to visit
groups until accepted or until all groups have been visited.
If no accepting groups are found, individuals initiate their
own group. When all available sites are occupied (set at
200 in the current simulations), group formation stops,
and individuals who failed to establish or join a group are
removed from the simulations (note that this corresponds
to the limited nesting sites model of global population
control of Avile´s et al. 2002).
Lottery Model
For the case of nonkin associations, we also explore a
model in which helping roles within groups, and thus
associated relative fitness costs (see above), are assigned
randomly with respect to genotype. We accomplish this
by first calculating expected levels of cooperation and rel-
ative fitnesses for all individuals in a group based on their
genetically determined cooperative tendencies (as in the
genetically based models described above) and then re-
distributing these values randomly among group mem-
bers. With this model we explore the hypothesis that ran-
dom assignment of helping roles within groups may
explain the evolution of extreme altruism among nonrel-
atives (Gadagkar 1991; Wilson 2001).
The Simulations and Analyses
In all but the at least cousins model, we initiated the sim-
ulations with individuals who, except for new mutations,
lacked grouping and cooperative tendencies. We ran each
simulation for 4,500 generations and estimated equilib-
rium values by averaging over the last 1,000 generations.
The evolving variables—cooperation, grouping tendencies,
and the average group size—reached a stationary state in
1,000 to 3,000 generations. To account for greater fluc-
tuations of the evolving variables, in the at least cousins
model we initiated the runs with cooperation and grouping
set at ∼0.3 and calculated equilibrium values over the last
3,000 generations of 6,000-generation runs. For all four
models of group formation, we systematically varied the
relative fitness costs of cooperation ( , 0.2, 0.4, 0.6,bp 0.0
0.8), intrinsic rate of growth ( , 1.0, 1.5, 2.0), andrp 0.5
group carrying capacity ( , 17, 50) parameters and1/cp 10
ran four replicates with different random number seeds
for each combination of parameter values. As in Avile´s et
al. (2002), we evaluated the relative contribution of each
of the parameters to the overall variance by calculating
Type I sums of squares (terms introduced in the same
order as in Avile´s et al. 2002). We conducted separate
analyses for each of the group formation models, with
cooperation and grouping tendencies arcsine transformed
and group size log transformed.
Examples of Empirical Systems Resembled by the Models
In Avile´s et al. (2002), we list some 18 species or animal
groups, from colonial birds to social bacteria, for which
the nonkin model is appropriate. Examples to which the
kin preference model applies include species of allodapine
Exoneura bees (Schwarz et al. 1998) and of Polistes wasps
(Strassmann 1996) in which females prefer relatives but
will nest with unrelated females if kin are not available.
Systems such as those of prairie voles (Getz et al. 1993),
dwarf mongooses (Creel and Waser 1994), white-nosed
coatis (Gompper et al. 1997), white-fronted bee-eaters
(Emlen and Wrege 1988), and white-winged choughs
(Heinsohn et al. 2000) are intermediate between the kin
preference and the at least cousins or sib only models in
that groups tend to be kin based, but nonrelatives are
accepted or even sought out if kin are not available (e.g.,
Heinsohn 1991). Taxa known to form groups with kin of
varying degrees of relatedness, as in the at least cousins
model, include female lions (Packer et al. 1991), African
wild dogs (Girman et al. 1997), and acorn woodpeckers
(Haydock et al. 2001). More exclusive kin groups that
approximate the sibs only model are found in some Hy-
menoptera (Pamilo et al. 1997; Peters et al. 1999), termites
(Shellman-Reeve 1997), thrips (Chapman and Crespi
1998), wolves (Mech 1999), and some eusocial mole rats
(Faulkes et al. 1997; Burland et al. 2002).
Results
Intragroup Relatedness and the Intrinsic Rate of Growth
In addition to the expected ranking in levels of intragroup
relatedness across the four models of group admission (fig.
1), two interesting patterns emerged in the simulations:
intragroup relatedness in the kin preference model was
considerably lower than in the at least cousins model,
despite an apparently minor difference in their kin ad-
mission rules, and intragroup relatedness in these two
models was a function of the intrinsic rate of growth (r,
in eq. [1]).
The low intragroup relatedness in the kin preference
model reflects the fact that nonrelatives vastly outnumber
Figure 1: Average pairwise relatedness within groups (left) and between-group over total genetic variance (right) under each of the models of group formation. Lines are cubic spline fits (lp
) for different values of the intrinsic rate of growth parameter (r ; eq. [1]). All levels of the group carrying capacity and relative fitness costs of cooperation included in the fits. Relatedness was100
calculated from pedigree relationships among group members, with the exclusion of self. The ratio of the variances, which depends on both genealogical relatedness and group size, was calculated
on the phenotypic values of grouping and cooperation, averaged across the two traits. A color version of this figure is available in the online edition of the American Naturalist.
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relatives in populations. Thus, even though with this
model nine out of 10 nonrelatives were rejected by the
groups (table 1), so many attempted joining that intra-
group relatedness was diluted nonetheless. This dilution
effect was more dramatic the smaller the intrinsic rate of
growth (fig. 1), reflecting the fact that the absolute number
of relatives, and thus of opportunities a group has to in-
corporate them, decreases as a species’ intrinsic fecundity
decreases.
Relatedness was also lower for lower intrinsic rates of
growth in the at least cousins model, but only when group
size exceeded approximately 10 individuals. For smaller
groups the opposite was true (fig. 1), reflecting the fact
that in a one-generation pool of relatives the proportional
representation of close versus more distant relatives de-
creases as the average family size increases. Thus, with an
average family of two, the expected ratio of siblings to first
cousins to second cousins is 2 : 4 : 8; with an average family
of four, the ratio is 4 : 16 : 64, or, in general, X1 : X2 : X3,
where X is the average family size. The bias against
more distant relatives in our kin discrimination vector
(table 1) was thus insufficient to counter this effect, and
small groups quickly became saturated with the propor-
tionally more abundant distant relatives. Differences in
intragroup relatedness were reflected in different ratios of
the between-group over total variances across models and
intrinsic rates of growth (fig. 1).
Evolution of Grouping and Group Size
Restricting the groups to close kin, sibs in particular, se-
verely limited the size of the groups formed, the more
strongly the smaller the intrinsic rate of growth (fig. 2).
In the sibs only model, for instance, groups were one-
quarter (for ; fig. 3) to one-fifth (for ; fig.rp 1.0 rp 0.5
4) the size of the groups formed in the nonkin and kin
preference models when interactions were mutualistic
( ) and the group carrying capacity was largebp 0
( ). The discrepancy in emerging group size be-1/cp 50
tween the models disappeared, however, as greater relative
fitness costs of cooperation prevented the evolution of
large groups in the less kin-restricted models (figs. 2, 3).
An associated effect concerned grouping tendencies, which
evolved to increasingly greater levels the more restrictive
the kin admission rule and, for models other than nonkin,
the smaller the intrinsic rate of growth (fig. 2).
Evolution of Cooperation
When interactions were mutualistic ( ), cooperationbp 0
evolved near its maximum value regardless of the kin ad-
mission rule (figs. 2, 3). As the cost of cooperation in-
creased, however, equilibrium levels of cooperation de-
clined precipitously when the groups contained
nonrelatives, less steeply so when restricted to cousins, and
imperceptibly so when restricted to sibs (figs. 2, 3). For
all models, larger groups, greater grouping tendencies, but
lower cooperative tendencies evolved as the group carrying
capacity increased (fig. 3), as previously reported for the
nonkin case in Avile´s et al. (2002). While the intrinsic rate
of growth had no effect on equilibrium levels of cooper-
ation in the nonkin and sibs only models, cooperation was
greater for larger r in the kin preference model and lower
for larger r in the at least cousins model (fig. 2), paralleling
the effects of this parameter on intragroup relatedness in
these models (in the at least cousins model, for the case
when groups were small; fig. 1).
The Lottery Model for Nonkin Associations
We found strong support for the hypothesis that randomly
assigned helping roles within groups allow the evolution
of highly altruistic behaviors ( ) among nonrelatives.b k 0
For all values of the relative fitness costs of cooperation,
in the lottery-based nonkin model, cooperation evolved
to levels almost as high as those in the sibs only model
(fig. 4), with the difference that group size was not limited
by the number of available relatives. As with the genetically
based nonkin model, in the lottery model large group sizes
evolved without need for high grouping tendencies (fig.
4), except that group sizes remained large even when costs
of cooperation were high. Thus, random assignment of
helping roles within groups allowed near maximal levels
of cooperation in maximally sized groups, independently
of how costly cooperation was (fig. 4).
Relative Role of Parameters
In the four genetically based models (table 1), there was
a dramatic reversal in the roles played by different param-
eters in determining equilibrium levels of grouping ten-
dencies and the average group size as the group admission
rule became more strongly kin restricted. While costs of
cooperation explained the largest fraction of the total var-
iance in both sociality measures in the nonkin (60% and
62%, respectively) and kin preference (58% and 68%, re-
spectively) models, the intrinsic rate of growth became the
primary determinant of grouping tendencies in the at least
cousins model (81% of total variance) and of grouping
tendencies and group size in the sibs only model (75%
and 49%, respectively). Costs of cooperation continued to
play the most important role in determining equilibrium
levels of cooperation in all four genetically based models
(58% of explained variance in the sibs only model and
180% of the explained variance in the remaining models)
but had no effect on any of the sociality measures in the
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Figure 2: Equilibrium levels of cooperation, grouping tendencies, and the average group size as a function of the relative fitness costs of cooperation (b; eq. [2]) and the intrinsic rate of growth
(r ; eq. [1]). In all figures, . Lines shown are cubic spline fits of four replicates for each combination of parameter values (for the spline fits, for all except cooperation and group1/cp 17 lp 0.01
size in the nonkin model and cooperation in the at least cousins model, where ). A color version of this figure is available in the online edition of the American Naturalist.lp 0.001
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Figure 3: Equilibrium levels of cooperation, grouping tendencies, and the average group size as a function of the relative fitness costs of cooperation (b; eq. [2]) and the group carrying capacity
(1/c ; eq. [1]). In all models, . Lines shown are cubic spline fits of four replicates for each combination of parameter values ( for cooperation and for grouping andrp 1.0 lp 0.001 lp 0.01
group size, except for group size in the at least cousins model where ). A color version of this figure is available in the online edition of the American Naturalist.lp 0.001
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Figure 4: Equilibrium levels of cooperation, grouping tendencies, and the average group size for the four models of group formation with genetic
determination of helping roles (dashed lines) and for the nonkin lottery model with stochastic assignment of helping roles (solid line with square
symbols). Lines shown are cubic spline fits ( ) across four replicates for each combination of parameter values. A color version of this figurelp 0.01
is available in the online edition of the American Naturalist.
lottery-based nonkin model ( for all three variables;P 1 .7
fig. 4).
Discussion
One of the critical evolutionary decisions in the origin of
a social system is whether or not to form groups with kin.
Understanding the factors involved in this decision is key
to understanding the diversity of kinship structures rep-
resented across social taxa (Pamilo et al. 1997; Hughes
1998; Ross 2001; Clutton-Brock 2002). Our results suggest
that at least two factors must play a role in this decision—
group size and degree of altruism, both as shaped by the
particular ecology of a species.
Our results, as have others (e.g., Kokko et al. 2001),
show that when interactions are mutualistic the kin com-
position of social groups has little effect on the level of
cooperation that evolves. Thus, with mutualistic cooper-
ation, groups should be free to incorporate as many non-
relatives as necessary to meet ecologically based group size
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requirements or accommodate constraints on group for-
mation such as limited time to form groups or difficulty
in identifying relatives.
On the other hand, our simulations also demonstrate
an important and previously unappreciated trade-off be-
tween the well-known solution to the problem of altru-
ism—restricting groups to close kin (Hamilton 1964;
Queller 1992; Frank 1998)—and group size. While re-
stricting the groups to close kin does facilitate the evo-
lution of highly altruistic behaviors, it also severely limits
group size, in particular in species with low reproductive
output. Forming groups with close kin may thus not be
an option when ecological demands require that groups
be larger than the number of available relatives, the time
available to form groups is limited, or relatives cannot be
easily identified. The following are some examples:
The tree-killing bark beetles must assemble thousands
to tens of thousands of individuals during the span of a
few hours to a few days to accumulate the critical mass
needed to overwhelm the defenses of live trees (Raffa and
Berryman 1987).
In the Australian cooperative breeding choughs, a min-
imum of four individuals is needed to successfully raise
one chick per year (Heinsohn 1992). Given the low re-
productive rate of this species, and thus short supply of
close relatives, the birds must kidnap and raise birds from
other groups for help in brood care (Heinsohn 1991).
In cellular slime molds, admittance of members of mul-
tiple, not necessarily related clones, allows the formation
of larger, faster migrating slugs (Foster et al. 2002).
Given limited time to find cofounding partners in the
pleometrotic ants (Bernasconi and Strassmann 1999), in-
dividuals form groups with the more abundant and, thus,
more commonly encountered nonrelatives.
In lions, larger male coalitions more successfully acquire
and maintain access to breeding females. Thus, in the
absence of close relatives, males form coalitions with non-
relatives (Packer et al. 1991).
Likewise, the polyandrous Galapagos hawks form coa-
litions of nonrelated males (Faaborg et al. 1995), presum-
ably because close relatives are in short supply given the
hawk’s characteristically low fecundity.
These natural history observations and our results sug-
gest that when a species’ group size requirements exceed
its average family size, social groups will be more likely to
include nonkin. The mismatch may arise either because
group size requirements are large (e.g., bark beetles, cel-
lular slime molds) or because intrinsic fecundity is low
(e.g., choughs, Galapagos hawks). In our simulations, had
we allowed the group admission rule to evolve, we predict
that admission requirements on the basis of kinship would
be more lax at larger group carrying capacities and smaller
intrinsic rates of growth. The resulting kin composition
then becomes a factor influencing the extent to which
highly altruistic behaviors can evolve.
Of course, the alternative to forming large groups from
the outset is to build them up across generations. In such
cases, large groups of closely related individuals can be
formed regardless of the intrinsic fecundity of the species,
as occurs in termites (Shellman-Reeve 1997), naked mole
rats (Faulkes et al. 1997; Burland et al. 2002), many ant
species, and in the development of multicellular organisms
(Michod 1996). This strategy, however, may not be an
option when the time to build up groups through internal
recruitment is limited (as in most of the examples of non-
kin systems listed in table 3 in Avile´s et al. 2002) or when
the small incipient groups (required to ensure close kin-
ship) cannot be easily established in the absence of spe-
cialized protective structures such as claustral foundation
(for the incipient groups) or egg shells and viviparity (for
the incipient multicellular organisms).
So, what is a group to do when its size requirements
must be met by admitting nonrelatives and costs of co-
operation are high? A case in point are the cellular slime
molds (Bonner 1982; Strassmann et al. 2000) where be-
haviors that involve giving up reproduction altogether
have evolved in aggregations that contain hundreds to
thousands of cells and, potentially, multiple clones (Foster
et al. 2002). Our results show that a viscous population
structure alone (data not shown) or preferred admission
of kin (the kin preference model) are insufficient to allow
the evolution of costly altruistic behaviors.
Our lottery model (fig. 4) demonstrates a potential so-
lution to this dilemma—the stochastic rather than genetic
determination of helping roles within groups. Such a pos-
sibility has been suggested for organisms as diverse as the
cellular slime molds (Wilson 2001), polygynous wasps
(Gadagkar 1991), and Galapagos hawks (Faaborg et al.
1995). In the cellular slime molds, for instance, the prob-
ability that a cell differentiates into a prespore or a prestalk
may largely depend on its phase in the cell cycle at the
time of aggregation (Gomer and Firtel 1987). Patterns of
paternity in the polyandrous Galapagos hawks suggest that
reproductive success is randomly distributed among males
in a group, possibly a result of males alternating their
copulations with the female in a schedule that the female
might control (Faaborg et al. 1995). Coin-flipping mech-
anisms of a similar nature may be involved in the decision
of which queen inherits the nest or stays home versus
forages in pleometrotic ants (Rissing et al. 1989; Bernas-
coni and Strassmann 1999) or in communally nesting bees
(Kukuk et al. 1998).
As with the rules of fair meiosis, which no doubt con-
tribute to the mostly cooperative action of genes within
individuals (Michod 1996), these lottery mechanisms
would not be immune to cheating and would thus require
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enforcement through policing (Frank 1995) and punish-
ment (Boyd and Richerson 1992). Nonetheless, by dis-
connecting genes from behavior, these lottery rules would
level the field in which individuals with different coop-
erative tendencies play.
In summary, we have shown that high levels of coop-
eration can evolve in groups of any kin composition as
long as the costs of cooperation are low to nonexistent.
With costly altruistic behaviors, restricting groups to close
kin allows the evolution of high levels of cooperation, but
it also imposes a limitation on the size of the groups
formed, the more severely so the smaller the intrinsic fe-
cundity of the species and the stricter the kin admission
rule. We point to a number of ecological circumstances
under which this group size limitation is problematic and
show that random rather than genetic assignment of help-
ing roles within groups allows the evolution of costly al-
truistic behaviors in groups of nonrelatives of any size.
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